SACM C. Coffin
Internet-Draft B. Cheikes
Intended status: Informational C. Schmidt
Expires: January 8, 2017 D. Haynes
The MITRE Corporation
J. Fitzgerald-McKay
Department of Defense
D. Waltermire
National Institute of Standards and Technology
July 7, 2016
SACM Vulnerability Assessment Scenario
draft-ietf-sacm-vuln-scenario-01
Abstract
This document describes an automated enterprise vulnerability
assessment scenario aligned with the SACM Use Cases. The scenario
assumes the existence of an endpoint management capability and begins
with an enterprise ingesting vulnerability description information.
Endpoints are assessed against the vulnerability description
information based on a combination of examining known endpoint
characterization information and collected endpoint information.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Vulnerability Assessment Pre-requisites . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Endpoint Management Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Vulnerability Description Information . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Endpoint Vulnerability Assessment Capability . . . . . . . . 5
6. Vulnerability Assessment Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.1. Changes in Revision -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.2. Changes Since Adopted as a WG I-D -00 . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.3. Changes in Revision draft-coffin-sacm-vuln-scenario-01 . 9
Appendix B. Implementation Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
B.1. Endpoint Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
B.2. Vulnerability Description Information . . . . . . . . . . 12
B.3. Secondary Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
B.4. Assessment Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix C. Priority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix D. SACM Usage Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix E. SACM Requirements and Charter - Future Work . . . . 15
Appendix F. SACM Use Case Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
F.1. Endpoint Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
F.2. Endpoint Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
F.3. Vulnerability Description Information . . . . . . . . . . 17
F.4. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
F.5. Secondary Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
F.6. Assessment Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix G. Alignment with Other Existing Works . . . . . . . . 17
G.1. Critical Security Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
G.1.1. Continuous Vulnerability Assessment . . . . . . . . . 18
G.1.2. Hardware and Software Inventories . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix H. Continuous Vulnerability Assessment . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix I. Data Attribute Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1. Introduction
This document describes a detailed, enterprise-specific vulnerability
assessment scenario from which information model elements can be
discovered. This scenario also informs protocol and data model
development in support of vulnerability assessment, as part of
overall posture assessment (see Appendix B for examples of solutions
that support this scenario).
Vulnerability discovery, disclosure, publication, and prioritization
is out of scope. However, given the importance of prioritization in
an enterprise's vulnerability assessment process, it is discussed in
Appendix C.
Information on how the scenario aligns with SACM and other existing
work is discussed in Appendix D through Appendix G.
2. Terminology
Vulnerability description information: Information pertaining to the
existence of a flaw or flaws in software, hardware, and/or
firmware, which could potentially have an adverse impact on
enterprise IT functionality and/or security. Vulnerability
description information should contain enough information to
support vulnerability detection.
Vulnerability detection data: A type of guidance extracted from
vulnerability description information that describes the
specific mechanisms of vulnerability detection that is used by
an enterprise's vulnerability management capability to
determine if a vulnerability is present on an endpoint.
Endpoint management capability: An enterprise IT capability managing
endpoint identity, endpoint information, and associated
metadata on an ongoing basis.
Vulnerability management capability: An enterprise IT capability
managing endpoint vulnerabilities and associated metadata on an
ongoing basis by ingesting vulnerability description
information and vulnerability detection data, and performing a
vulnerability assessment.
Vulnerability assessment: The process of determining whether a set
of endpoints is vulnerable according to the information
contained in the vulnerability description information.
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3. Assumptions
A number of assumptions must be stated in order to further clarify
the position and scope of this document.
The document assumes that:
o The enterprise has received vulnerability description information,
and that the information has already been processed into
vulnerability detection data that the enterprise's security
software tools can understand and use.
o The enterprise has a means of identifying enterprise endpoints
through the execution of Target Endpoint Discovery Tasks although
assertions about some details of this capability are made.
o The enterprise has a means of extracting relevant information
about enterprise endpoints in a form that is compatible with the
vulnerability description data.
o All information described in this scenario is available in the
vulnerability description data and serves as the basis of this
assessment.
o The enterprise can provide all relevant information about any
endpoint needed to perform the described assessment.
o The enterprise has a mechanism for long-term storage of
vulnerability description information, vulnerability detection
data, and vulnerability assessment results.
o The enterprise has a procedure for reassessment of endpoints at
some point after initial assessment (see Appendix H for more
information).
4. Vulnerability Assessment Pre-requisites
In order to successfully support the vulnerability assessment
scenario, an enterprise needs to have the following capabilities
deployed on their network and information readily available.
4.1. Endpoint Management Capability
An endpoint management capability is assumed to be in place within
the enterprise, and is expected to collect a minimum set of
attributes from the endpoints under management via Collection Tasks
and to establish an endpoint's identity within the scope of that
domain. Endpoint identity can be established by collecting certain
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identifying attributes, collectively known as the Target Endpoint
Identifier, that allow for unique and persistent tracking of
endpoints on the enterprise network. Examples include, but are not
limited to, IP address, MAC address, Fully Qualified Domain Names
(FQDNs), pre-provisioned identifiers such as Globally Unique
Identifiers (GUIDs) or copies of serial numbers, certificates,
hardware identity values, or similar attributes. To simplify the
identification of an endpoint, a Target Endpoint Label may be created
and assigned to refer to the Target Endpoint Identifier. All of the
information collected by the endpoint management capability is
stored, with appropriate metadata (i.e. timestamp), in a central
location and used to build up a Target Endpoint Characterization
Record and Target Endpoint Profile via a Target Endpoint
Characterization Task. The endpoint management capability is
expected to be performed on an ongoing basis, resulting in routine,
or even event-driven, collection of basic endpoint information.
See Appendix I for information-specific details.
4.2. Vulnerability Description Information
Vulnerability description information is expected to be periodically
received by the enterprise. Upon receipt, the vulnerability
description information is expected to be assigned a unique tracking
identifier, stored in a repository (with appropriate metadata) in raw
form, and transformed into a machine-readable vulnerability detection
data with unique tracking identifier understood by the components
described by this scenario. This transformed form can be referred to
as the vulnerability detection data. At some point, receipt and
processing of vulnerability description data is expected to trigger
the vulnerability assessment.
See Appendix I for information-specific details.
5. Endpoint Vulnerability Assessment Capability
When new vulnerability description information is received by the
enterprise, affected endpoints are identified and assessed. The
vulnerability is said to apply to an endpoint if the endpoint
satisfies the conditions expressed in the vulnerability detection
data.
A vulnerability assessment (i.e. vulnerability detection) is
performed in two steps:
o Endpoint information collected by the endpoint management
capability is examined by the vulnerability management capability
through Evaluation Tasks.
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o If the data possessed by the endpoint management capability is
insufficient, a Collection Task is triggered and the necessary
data is collected from the target endpoint.
Vulnerability detection relies on the examination of different
endpoint information depending on the nature of a specific
vulnerability. Common endpoint information used to detect a
vulnerability includes:
o A specific software version is installed on the endpoint
o File system attributes
o Specific state attributes
In many cases, the endpoint information needed to determine an
endpoint's vulnerability status will have been previously collected
by the Endpoint Management Capability and available in a Repository.
However, in other cases, the necessary endpoint information will not
be readily available in a Repository and a Collection Task will be
triggered to collect it from the target endpoint. Of course, an
implementation of an endpoint management capability may prefer to
enable operators to perform this collection under certain
circumstances, even when sufficient information can be provided by
the endpoint management capability (e.g. there may be freshness
requirements for information).
The collection of additional endpoint information for the purpose of
vulnerability assessment does not necessarily need to be a pull by
the vulnerability assessment capability. Over time, some new pieces
of information that are needed during common types of assessments
might be identified. An endpoint management capability can be
reconfigured to have this information delivered automatically. This
avoids the need to trigger additional Collection Tasks to gather this
information during assessments, streamlining the assessment process.
Likewise, it might be observed that certain information delivered by
an endpoint management capability is rarely used. In this case, it
might be useful to re-configure the endpoint management capability to
no longer collect this information to reduce network and processing
overhead. Instead, a new Collection Task can be triggered to gather
this data on the rare occasions when it is needed.
See Appendix I for information-specific details.
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6. Vulnerability Assessment Results
Vulnerability assessment results present evaluation results along
with sufficient context, so that appropriate action can be taken.
Vulnerability assessment results are ideally stored for later use.
See Appendix I for information-specific details.
7. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA.
8. Security Considerations
This document provides a core narrative that walks through an
automated enterprise vulnerability assessment scenario and is aligned
with SACM "Endpoint Security Posture Assessment: Enterprise Use
Cases" [RFC7632]. As a result, the security considerations for
[RFC7632] apply to this document. Furthermore, the data collected as
part of the vulnerability assessment may provide attackers with
useful information such as what software an enterprise is running on
their endpoints. As a result, organizations should consider properly
protecting this information.
9. Informative References
[charter-ietf-sacm-01]
Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring, "Charter,
Version 1.0", October 2015,
.
[critical-controls]
Center for Internet Security, "Critical Security Controls,
Version 6.0", .
[cvrf] Industry Consortium for Advancement of Security on the
Internet, "Common Vulnerability and Reporting Framework",
May 2012, .
[draft-hansbury-sacm-oval-info-model-mapping-02]
Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring, "OVAL and
the SACM Information Model", March 2016,
.
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[I-D.coffin-sacm-nea-swid-patnc]
Coffin, C., Haynes, D., Schmidt, C., and J. Fitzgerald-
McKay, "SWID Message and Attributes for PA-TNC", draft-
coffin-sacm-nea-swid-patnc-01 (work in progress), June
2016.
[I-D.cokus-sacm-oval-results-model]
Cokus, M., Haynes, D., Rothenberg, D., and J. Gonzalez,
"OVAL(R) Results Model", draft-cokus-sacm-oval-results-
model-00 (work in progress), March 2016.
[I-D.haynes-sacm-oval-definitions-model]
Cokus, M., Haynes, D., Rothenberg, D., and J. Gonzalez,
"OVAL(R) Definitions Model", draft-haynes-sacm-oval-
definitions-model-00 (work in progress), March 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sacm-requirements]
Cam-Winget, N. and L. Lorenzin, "Security Automation and
Continuous Monitoring (SACM) Requirements", draft-ietf-
sacm-requirements-13 (work in progress), March 2016.
[I-D.rothenberg-sacm-oval-sys-char-model]
Cokus, M., Haynes, D., Rothenberg, D., and J. Gonzalez,
"OVAL(R) System Characteristics Model", draft-rothenberg-
sacm-oval-sys-char-model-00 (work in progress), March
2016.
[RFC7632] Waltermire, D. and D. Harrington, "Endpoint Security
Posture Assessment: Enterprise Use Cases", RFC 7632,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7632, September 2015,
.
Appendix A. Change Log
A.1. Changes in Revision -01
Clarified how the endpoint management capability can reconfigured
over time to adapt to the needs of an enterprise. GitHub issue #12
(https://github.com/sacmwg/vulnerability-scenario/issues/12).
Included references to the various appendices in the document.
GitHub issue #18 (https://github.com/sacmwg/vulnerability-scenario/
issues/18).
Fixed typos and other minor editorial changes in the document.
GitHub issue #19 (https://github.com/sacmwg/vulnerability-scenario/
issues/18). GitHub issue #20 (https://github.com/sacmwg/
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vulnerability-scenario/issues/20). GitHub issue #22
(https://github.com/sacmwg/vulnerability-scenario/issues/22).
Updated references to the Critical Controls to Version 6.0. GitHub
issue #23 (https://github.com/sacmwg/vulnerability-scenario/
issues/23).
Aligned the scenario with SACM Tasks. GitHub issue #25
(https://github.com/sacmwg/vulnerability-scenario/issues/25).
A.2. Changes Since Adopted as a WG I-D -00
Made various organizational and editorial changes as proposed by Adam
Montville. GitHub issue #4 (https://github.com/sacmwg/vulnerability-
scenario/issues/4).
Removed the TODO from the Security Considerations section
(https://github.com/sacmwg/vulnerability-scenario/issues/8).
Clarified the definition of "vulnerability detection data" to explain
how it was guidance and provided instructions for security tools on
how to carry out a vulnerability assessment. GitHub issue #13
(https://github.com/sacmwg/vulnerability-scenario/issues/13).
Changed "targeted collection" to "supplemental collection". GitHub
issue #14 (https://github.com/sacmwg/vulnerability-scenario/
issues/14).
Clarified that the ability for an enterprise to convert vulnerability
description information and process it into a format usable by
security tools is the same as the converting vulnerability
description information into vulnerability detection data. GitHub
issue #15 (https://github.com/sacmwg/vulnerability-scenario/
issues/15).
Determine if we need to remove references to the long-term storage of
data in repositories. GitHub issue #16 (https://github.com/sacmwg/
vulnerability-scenario/issues/16).
Moved the information needs captured in Appendix D.2 into the
Information Model. GitHub issue #17 (https://github.com/sacmwg/
vulnerability-scenario/issues/17).
A.3. Changes in Revision draft-coffin-sacm-vuln-scenario-01
Clarification of the vulnerability description data IDs in sections 4
and 6.
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Added "vulnerability remediation" to the Assessment Results and Data
Attribute Table and Definitions sections.
Added Implementation Examples to Endpoint Identification and Initial
(Pre-Assessment) Data Collection, Vulnerability Description Data,
Endpoint Applicability and Assessment, and Assessment Results
sections.
Added an example to vulnerability description data in the scope
section.
Added a sentence to clarify vulnerability description data definition
in the scope section.
Added data repository example for long-term storage scope item.
Added sentence to direct reader to examples of basic system
information in endpoint identification section.
Split the examples of information to collect in the pre-assessment
collection section into a basic and advanced list.
Added examples of data stored in the repository in the Assessment
Results section.
Added sentence for human-assigned attributes in the Future Work
section.
Replaced "vulnerability report" to "vulnerability description data"
because the term report was causing confusion. Similarly, replaced
"assessment report" with "assessment results".
Replaced "Configuration Management Database (CMDB)" with "Repository"
which is SACM's term for a data store.
Replaced endpoint "Role" with "Purpose" because "Role" is already
defined in SACM. Also, removed "Function" because it too is already
defined in SACM.
Clarified that the document does not try to define a normalized data
format for vulnerability description data although it does not
preclude the creation of such a format.
Included additional examples of software configuration information.
Clarified the section around endpoint identification to make it clear
designation attributes used to correlate and identify endpoints are
both persistent and unique. Furthermore, text was added to explain
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how the persistency of attributes may vary. This was based on
knowledge gained from the Endpoint ID Design Team.
Updated the Security Considerations section to mention those
described in [RFC7632].
Removed text around Bring Your Own Device (BYOD). While important,
BYOD just adds complexity to this initial draft. BYOD should be
addressed in a later revision.
Merged the list of "basic endpoint information" and the list of
"human-assigned endpoint attributes" as both represent data we want
to collect about an endpoint. Whether or not that data is natively
available on the endpoint for collection or assigned by a human,
computed, or derived from other data which may or may not be
available on the endpoint for collection seems arbitrary. With this
scenario, we primarily care about expressing information needs rather
than how the information is collected or from where.
Appendix B. Implementation Examples
B.1. Endpoint Data Collection
Within the SACM Architecture, the Internal and External Collector
components could be used to allow enterprises to collect posture
attributes that demonstrate compliance with enterprise policy.
Endpoints can be required to provide posture attributes, which may
include identification attributes to enable persistent
communications.
The SWID Message and Attributes for PA-TNC standard
[I-D.coffin-sacm-nea-swid-patnc] defines collection and validation of
software identities using the ISO Software Identification Tag
Standard. Using this standard, the identity of all installed
software including the endpoint operating system, could be collected
and used for later assessment.
The OVAL Definitions Model [I-D.haynes-sacm-oval-definitions-model]
provides a data model that can be used to specify what posture
attributes to collect as well as their expected values which can be
used to drive an assessment.
The OVAL System Characteristics Model
[I-D.rothenberg-sacm-oval-sys-char-model] can be used to capture
information about an endpoint. The model is specifically suited to
expressing OS information, endpoint identification information (such
as IP and MAC addresses), and other endpoint metadata.
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B.2. Vulnerability Description Information
The Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework (CVRF) [cvrf] is an XML-
based language that attempts to standardize the creation of
vulnerability description information. Using CVRF, the enterprise
could create automated tools based on the standardized schema which
would obtain the needed and relevant information useful for later
assessments and assessment results.
B.3. Secondary Assessment
Within the SACM Architecture, the assessment task would be handled by
the Evaluator component. If previously collected data is used, it
would be obtained from a Data Store component.
Within the SACM Architecture, the Internal and External Collector
components could be used to allow enterprises to collect posture
attributes that demonstrate compliance with enterprise policy.
Endpoints can be required to provide posture attributes, which may
include identification attributes to enable persistent
communications.
The SWID Message and Attributes for PA-TNC standard defines
collection and validation of software identities using the ISO
Software Identification Tag Standard. Using this standard, all
installed software including the endpoint operating system could be
collected and stored for later assessment.
The OVAL Definitions Model provides a data model that can be used to
specify what posture attributes to collect as well as their expected
values which can be used to drive an assessment.
The OVAL System Characteristics Model can be used to capture
information about an endpoint. The model is specifically suited to
expressing OS information, endpoint identification information (such
as IP and MAC addresses), and other endpoint metadata.
The SACM Internal and External Attribute Collector components can be
used to allow enterprises to collect posture attributes that
demonstrate compliance with enterprise policy. Endpoints can be
required to provide posture attributes, which may include
identification attributes to enable persistent communications.
B.4. Assessment Results
The OVAL Results Model [I-D.cokus-sacm-oval-results-model] provides a
data model to encode the results of the assessment, which could then
be stored in a Repository and later accessed. The assessment results
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described in this scenario could be stored and later accessed using
the OVAL Results Model. Note that the use of the OVAL Results Model
for sharing results is not recommended per section 7.3 of the OVAL
and the SACM Information Model
[draft-hansbury-sacm-oval-info-model-mapping-02].
Within the SACM Architecture, the generation of the assessment
results would occur in the Report Generator component. Those results
might then be moved to a Data Store component for later sharing and
retrieval as defined by SACM.
Appendix C. Priority
Priorities associated with the vulnerability description information,
assessment results, and any remedy is important, but is treated as a
separate challenge and, as such, has not been integrated into the
description of this scenario. Nevertheless, it is important to point
out and describe the use of priorities in the overall vulnerability
assessment scenario as a separate issue with its own sets of
requirements.
Priority in regard to vulnerability description information, can be
viewed in a couple of different ways within an enterprise. The
assessment prioritization involves prioritization of the
vulnerability description information assessment process. This
determines what vulnerability description information is assessed,
and in what order it is assessed in. For instance, a vulnerability
affecting an operating system or application used throughout the
enterprise would likely be prioritized higher than a vulnerability in
an application which is used only on a few, low-criticality
endpoints.
The prioritization of remedies relates to the enterprise remediation
and mitigation process based on the discovered vulnerabilities. Once
an assessment has been performed and applicable endpoints identified,
enterprise vulnerability managers must determine where to focus their
efforts to apply appropriate remedies. For example, a vulnerability
that is easily exploitable and which can allow arbitrary code
execution might be remedied before a vulnerability that is more
difficult to exploit or which just degrades performance.
Some vulnerability description information include severities and/or
other information that places the vulnerability in context. This
information can be used in both of the priority types discussed
above. In other cases, enterprise administrators may need to
prioritize based only on what they know about their enterprise and
the description provided in the vulnerability description
information.
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Examples of data attributes specific to priority of assessments and/
or remedies include (but not limited to) the following:
o Enterprise - defined purpose of the device, criticality of the
device, exposure of the device, etc.
o Severity attributes - A rating or score that attempts to provide
the level of severity or criticality associated with a given
vulnerability.
o Cyber threat intelligence - information such as tactics,
techniques, and procedures of threat actors, indicators of
compromise, incidents, courses of action, etc. that help the
enterprise understand relevant threats and how to detect,
mitigate, or respond to them.
Appendix D. SACM Usage Scenarios
The SACM "Endpoint Security Posture Assessment: Enterprise Use Cases"
document ([RFC7632]) defines multiple usage scenarios that are meant
to provide examples of implementing the use cases and building block
capabilities. Below is a brief summary of some of these usage
scenarios and how this document aligns and/or adds additional value
to the identified usage scenarios.
o Automated Checklist Verification (2.2.2) - "An enterprise operates
a heterogeneous IT environment. They utilize vendor-provided
automatable security configuration checklists for each operating
system and application used within their IT environment. Multiple
checklists are used from different vendors to ensure adequate
coverage of all IT assets." The usage scenario, as defined in the
RFC, is targeted at the checklist level and can be interpreted as
being specific to endpoint configuration. There is mention of
patch assessment and vulnerability mitigation, but the usage
scenario could be expanded upon by including vulnerability
verification. Replacing the idea of a checklist in the SACM usage
scenario with vulnerability would allow the usage scenario to
align almost exactly with the scenario described in this document.
Instead of collecting automatable security configuration
checklists, the enterprise would collect automatable vulnerability
description information available from the vendor as described or
possibly from other interested third-parties.
o Detection of Posture Deviations (2.2.3) - "An enterprise has
established secure configuration baselines for each different type
of endpoint within their IT environment. When an endpoint
connects to the network, the appropriate baseline configuration is
communicated to the endpoint. Once the baseline has been
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established, the endpoint is monitored for any change events
pertaining to the baseline on an ongoing basis. When a change
occurs to posture defined in the baseline, updated posture
information is exchanged. When the endpoint detects a posture
change, an alert is generated identifying the specific changes in
posture." This usage scenario would support the concept of
endpoints signaling or alerting the enterprise to changes in the
posture relates to endpoint vulnerabilities in the same way that
it would for configurations. Replacing the idea of a checklist
with vulnerability description data allows the SACM usage scenario
and the scenario described in this document to align in their
objectives.
o Asynchronous Compliance/Vulnerability Assessment at Ice Station
Zebra (2.2.5) - "An isolated arctic IT environment that is
separated from the main university network. The only network
communications are via an intermittent, low-speed, high-latency,
high-cost satellite link. Remote network admins will need to show
continued compliance with the security policies of the university,
the government, and the provider of the satellite network, as well
as keep current on vulnerability testing." This SACM usage
scenario describes vulnerability assessment and aligns well with
the vulnerability scenario described in this document. The
endpoint assets are identified and associated data is published in
a Repository. Vulnerability description information is collected
and saved in a Repository as it is released. The vulnerability
description information is queued for later assessment, then the
assessment results and vulnerability description information are
stored after assessment. The only real difference in this SACM
usage scenario is the timing of the assessments. The scenario
described within this document would have no problems adjusting to
the timing of this SACM usage scenario or anything similar.
Appendix E. SACM Requirements and Charter - Future Work
In the course authoring this document, some additional considerations
for possible future work were noted. The following points were taken
from the SACM Requirements [I-D.ietf-sacm-requirements], SACM Charter
[charter-ietf-sacm-01], and SACM Use Cases ([RFC7632]) documents and
represent work that may be necessary to support the tasks or goals of
SACM going forward.
o The SACM requirements mentions "Result Reporting" with
applications but no detail around what the assessment results data
set should include. In the case of vulnerability assessment
results, context is important and details beyond just a Pass or
Fail result are needed in order to take action. A good example of
this might be the Priority of the vulnerability itself and how
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many systems it affects within the enterprise. With this in mind,
it might be worthwhile to investigate a minimum data set or schema
for assessment results. The concern here is with vulnerability
description data, but this could apply to other enterprise
processes as well.
o The "Human-assigned endpoint attributes" mentioned previously in
this scenario are touched on in the SACM use cases, but the topic
could probably be explored in much more depth. Enterprise policy
and behaviors could be greatly influenced by endpoint attributes
such as locations, how the endpoint is used, and criticality.
When and how these data attributes are collected, as well as what
the minimum or common set might look like, would be good topics
for future related SACM work. In addition, the storage of these
attributes could be central (stored in a data repository) or they
could be assigned and stored on the endpoints themselves.
Appendix F. SACM Use Case Alignment
F.1. Endpoint Identification
This sub-step aligns with the Endpoint Discovery, Endpoint
Characterization, and Endpoint Target Identification building block
capabilities. The alignment is due to the fact that the purpose of
this sub-step is to discover, identify, and characterize all
endpoints on an enterprise network.
F.2. Endpoint Data Collection
This sub-step aligns with the Data Publication building block
capability because this section involves storage of endpoint
attributes within an enterprise Repository. This sub-step also
aligns with the Endpoint Characterization and Endpoint Target
Identification building block capabilities because it further
characterizes the endpoint through automated and possibly manual
means. There is direct alignment with the Endpoint Component
Inventory, Posture Attribute Identification, and Posture Attribute
Value Collection building block capabilities since the purpose of
this sub-step is to perform an initial inventory of the endpoint and
collect basic attributes and their values. Last, there is alignment
with the Collection Guidance Acquisition building block capabilities
as the inventory and collection of endpoint attributes would be
directed by some type of enterprise or third-party guidance.
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F.3. Vulnerability Description Information
This step aligns with the Data Publication and Data Retrieval
building block capabilities because this section details storage of
vulnerability description information within an enterprise Repository
and later retrieval of the same.
F.4. Applicability
This sub-step aligns with the Data Retrieval, Data Query, and Posture
Attribute Value Query building block capabilities because, in this
sub-step, the process is attempting to determine the vulnerability
status of the endpoint using the data that has previously been
collected.
F.5. Secondary Assessment
This sub-step aligns with the Data Publication building block
capability because this section details storage of endpoint
attributes within an enterprise Repository. The sub-step also aligns
with the Collection Guidance Acquisition building block capability
since the vulnerability description information (guidance) drives the
collection of additional endpoint attributes.
This sub-step aligns with the Endpoint Characterization (both manual
and automated) and Endpoint Target Identification building block
capabilities because it could further characterize the endpoint
through automated and possibly manual means. There is direct
alignment with the Endpoint Component Inventory, Posture Attribute
Identification, and Posture Attribute Value Collection building block
capabilities since the purpose of this sub-step is to perform
additional and more specific component inventories and collections of
endpoint attributes and their values.
F.6. Assessment Results
This step aligns with the Data Publication and Data Retrieval
building block capabilities because this section details storage of
vulnerability assessment results within an enterprise Repository and
later retrieval of the same.
Appendix G. Alignment with Other Existing Works
G.1. Critical Security Controls
The Center for Internet Security's Critical Security Controls
[critical-controls] includes security controls for a number of usage
scenarios, some of which are covered in this document. This section
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documents the alignment between the Center's controls and the
relevant elements of the scenario.
G.1.1. Continuous Vulnerability Assessment
"CSC 4: Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation," which
is described by the Center for Internet Security as "Continuously
acquire, assess, and take action on new information in order to
identify vulnerabilities, remediate, and minimize the window of
opportunity for attackers." The scenario described in this document
is aligned with CSC 4 in multiple ways:
CSC 4.1 applies to this scenario in that it calls for running
regular, automated scanning to deliver prioritized lists of
vulnerabilities with which to respond. The scenario described in
this document is intended to be executed on a continuous basis, and
the priorities of both vulnerability description information and the
remedy of vulnerabilities are discussed in the Priority section
earlier in this document.
This scenario assumes that the enterprise already has a source for
vulnerability description information as described in CSC 4.4.
Both CSC 4.2 and 4.7 are made possible by writing information to a
Repository since this makes previously collected data available for
later analysis.
While this scenario does not go into the details of how
prioritization would be calculated or applied, it does touch on some
of the important ways in which prioritization would impact the
endpoint assessment process in the Priority section. As such, the
Priority section aligns with CSC 4.8, which deals with vulnerability
priority. Vulnerability priority in this scenario is discussed in
terms of the vulnerability description information priority during
receipt, as well as the vulnerability priority with regards to
remedies.
The described scenario does not address the details of applying a
remedy based on assessment results. As such, CSC 4.5 which deals
with mitigations and patching, is out of scope for this work.
Similarly, CSC 4.3 prescribes performing scans in authenticated mode
and CSC 4.6 prescribes monitoring logs. This scenario does not get
into the means by which data is collected, focusing on "what" to
collect rather than "how", and as such does not have corresponding
sections, although the procedures described are not incompatible with
either of these controls.
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The CSC 4 System Entity Relationship diagram directly aligns with the
scenario described in this document with the exception of applying
patches to endpoints.
G.1.2. Hardware and Software Inventories
This scenario is also aligned with, and describes a process for,
collecting and maintaining hardware and software inventories, which
are covered by the Center for Internet Security CSC 1 "Inventory of
Authorized and Unauthorized Devices" and CSC 2 "Inventory of
Authorized and Unauthorized Software." This scenario documents a
process that is specific to collecting and maintaining hardware and
software data attributes for vulnerability assessment purposes, but
the collection of the hardware attributes and software inventory
documented in the Endpoint Data Collection section that follows can
also be used for the purpose of implementing authorized and
unauthorized hardware and software management processes (e.g.,
scanning tools looking for unauthorized software). Moreover, the
ability to accurately identify endpoints and, to a lesser degree,
applications is integral to effective endpoint data collection and
vulnerability management.
The Endpoint Data Collection section does not have coverage for the
specific details described in CSC 1 and 2 as they are different
processes and would be out-of-scope of this scenario, but the section
does provide the data necessary to support the controls.
The Endpoint Identification and Endpoint Data Collection sections
within this scenario align with CSC 1.1 and 1.4 by identifying
enterprise endpoints and collecting their hardware and network
attributes. The Endpoint Data Collection section aligns with and
supports CSC 2.3 by defining a software inventory process and a
method of obtaining operating system and file system attributes. The
rest of the items from CSC 1 and 2 deal with implementation details
and would be out-of-scope for this document.
Appendix H. Continuous Vulnerability Assessment
It is not sufficient to perform a single assessment when
vulnerability description information is published without any
further checking. Doing so does not address the possibility that the
reported vulnerability might be introduced to the enterprise
environment after the initial assessment completes. For example, new
endpoints can be introduced to the environment which have old
software or are not up-to-date with patches. Another example is
where unauthorized or obsolete software is installed on an existing
endpoint by enterprise users after vulnerability description
information and initial assessment has taken place. Moreover,
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enterprises might not wish to, or be able to, assess all
vulnerability description information immediately when they come in.
Conflicts with other critical activities or limited resources might
mean that some alerts, especially those that the enterprise deems as
"low priority", are not used to guide enterprise assessments until
sometime after the initial receipt.
The scenario above describes a single assessment of endpoints.
However, it does not make any assumptions as to when this assessment
occurs relative to the original receipt of the vulnerability
description data that led to this assessment. The assessment could
immediately follow the ingestion of the vulnerability description
information, could be delayed, or the assessment might represent a
reassessment of some vulnerability description information against
which endpoints had previously been assessed. Moreover, the scenario
incorporates long-term storage of collected data, vulnerability
description information, and assessment results in order to
facilitate meaningful and ongoing reassessment.
Appendix I. Data Attribute Table
The following table maps all major data attributes against each major
process where they are used.
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| | vulnerabil | Endpoint Id | Endpoint Ap | Assessmen |
| | ity descri | entificatio | plicability | t Results |
| | ption data | n and | and | |
| | | Initial | Assessment | |
| | | Data | | |
| | | Collection | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| *Endpoint* | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Collection | | X | X | |
| date/time | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Endpoint | | X | X | |
| type | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Hardware ver | X | X | X | |
| sion/firmwar | | | | |
| e | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Operating | X | X | X | |
| system | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Operating | X | X | X | |
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| system | | | | |
| attributes | | | | |
| (e.g., | | | | |
| version, | | | | |
| service pack | | | | |
| level, | | | | |
| edition, | | | | |
| etc.) | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Installed | X | X | X | X |
| software | | | | |
| name | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Installed | X | X | X | X |
| software | | | | |
| attributes | | | | |
| (e.g., | | | | |
| version, | | | | |
| patch level, | | | | |
| install | | | | |
| path, etc.) | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Open ports/s | X | X | X | |
| ervices | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Operating | X | X | X | |
| system | | | | |
| optional | | | | |
| component | | | | |
| inventory | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Location | | X | | X |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Purpose | | X | | X |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Criticality | | X | | X |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| File system | X | | X | |
| attributes | | | | |
| (e.g., | | | | |
| versions, | | | | |
| size, write | | | | |
| date, | | | | |
| modified | | | | |
| date, | | | | |
| checksum, | | | | |
| etc.) | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
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| Shared | X | | X | |
| libraries | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Other | X | | X | |
| software con | | | | |
| figuration | | | | |
| information | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| *External vu | | | | |
| lnerability | | | | |
| description | | | | |
| data* | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Ingest Date | X | | X | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Date of | X | | X | |
| Release | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Version | X | | X | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| External | X | | X | X |
| vuln ID | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Severity | | | | X |
| Score | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| *Assessment | | | | |
| Results* | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Date of | | | X | X |
| assessment | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Date of data | | X | X | X |
| collection | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Endpoint ide | | X | X | X |
| ntification | | | | |
| and/or | | | | |
| locally | | | | |
| assigned ID | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Vulnerable | X | X | X | X |
| software | | | | |
| product(s) | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Endpoint vul | | | X | X |
| nerability | | | | |
| status | | | | |
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+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Vulnerabilit | X | | | X |
| y | | | | |
| description | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| Vulnerabilit | X | | | X |
| y | | | | |
| remediation | | | | |
+--------------+------------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
Table 1: Vulnerability Assessment Attributes
Authors' Addresses
Christopher Coffin
The MITRE Corporation
202 Burlington Road
Bedford, MA 01730
USA
Email: ccoffin@mitre.org
Brant Cheikes
The MITRE Corporation
202 Burlington Road
Bedford, MA 01730
USA
Email: bcheikes@mitre.org
Charles Schmidt
The MITRE Corporation
202 Burlington Road
Bedford, MA 01730
USA
Email: cmschmidt@mitre.org
Daniel Haynes
The MITRE Corporation
202 Burlington Road
Bedford, MA 01730
USA
Email: dhaynes@mitre.org
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Jessica Fitzgerald-McKay
Department of Defense
9800 Savage Road
Ft. Meade, Maryland
USA
Email: jmfitz2@nsa.gov
David Waltermire
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20877
USA
Email: david.waltermire@nist.gov
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