

Computer underground Digest    Sun Feb 14, 1993   Volume 5 : Issue 13
                           ISSN  1004-042X

       Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
       Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
       Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
                          Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
       Copy Editor: Etaion Shrdlu, Seniur

CONTENTS, #5.13 (Feb 14, 1993)
File 1--Talking with the Underground
File 2--System Surfing at U-Cal/Davis
File 3--Unemployed Programmers Turning their Talents to Evil??
File 4--"Hackers" take on the UFOs?

Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
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Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL 60115.

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----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: 23 Jan 1993 16:14:31 -0700 (MST)
From:  <KAPLAN%UABPA@ARIZVMS.BITNET>
Subject: File 1--Talking with the Underground

(Previously published in the Computer Security Institute's newsletter
- The Alert - and the French Chaos Computer Club's Chaos Digest)

Talking with the underground
by Ray Kaplan and Joe Kovara

Information about system and network vulnerabilities is sparse, not
readily available and carefully guarded by those segments of the
security community that collect and control it.  Given that the
legitimate security community won't share information about
vulnerabilities with us, isn't it logical that we include outsiders
(the computer underground or ex-computer criminals) in these
discussions.  Amid criticism, we decided to let the community ask the
advice of experts  the crackers who have successfully cracked computer
networks.

Exploring the details of vulnerabilities

Over 300 participants at 25 sites in US, Canada, Europe and Mexico
joined law enforcement, members of the security community, and former
members of the computer underground as we explored these questions in
the November 24, 1992, audio teleconference entitled System and
Network Security: How You Will Be Attacked and What to do About It.

Our guests included Kevin Mitnick and Lenny DiCicco, who successfully
penetrated a range of networks and telephone systems.  They were both
sentenced in federal court after successfully penetrating Digital
Equipment Corporation's computer network in 1988.  They stole the
source code to VMS, Digital's widely used operating system.  Their
exploits were profiled in the book Cyberpunk: Outlaws and Hackers on
the Computer Frontier, by Katie Hafner and John Markoff (1991, Simon
and Schuster).

Our panelists included Hal Hendershot, head of the FBI Computer Crime
Unit in Washington D.C.; Don Delaney, Senior Investigator with the New
York State Police; Computer security consultant Dave Johnson of Talon
Systems (Los Alto, CA); Robert Clyde, V.P. of the Security Products
Group, RAXCO, Inc.; and Lew, the organizational director of automation
for a medium size company  a former cracker.

The panelists shared their considerable experience and discussed
techniques used to break in to computer networks.  Among the
penetration techniques discussed were the uses of psychological
subversion, telecommunications monitoring techniques, and the
exploitation of known system and network bugs.  Despite the popularity
of these attack techniques, they are little known outside of the
computer underground and the computer security community.

Panelists issue stern warnings about telecommunications security

Don Delaney stated that tremendous loss of money from both toll and
Private Branch eXchange (PBX) fraud is whats happening in the telecom
area.  Since the security of a PBX is the responsibility of its owner,
such losses are not being absorbed by the telephone companies
involved.  These losses have been known to force the owners of
compromised PBXs into bankruptcy.  Delaney joins us in saying that its
not a matter of if you will be hit, but when.

According to DiCicco, compromising the telephone system gave he and
Kevin the ability to attack systems without the fear of discovery -
telco tracebacks were simply ineffective.  They could attack networks
at many different points of entry all over the country.  This is why
no one could keep them out, even though their victims knew their
systems and networks had been compromised.  If all of this does not
scare you, consider Lenny's admission that at one point he and Kevin
had compromised over 50 telco switches in the United States, including
all of California, parts of New Jersey, New York and New Hampshire.
At one point they even controlled all three of the switches that
provided phone service to Manhattan.

Yes, the law is ready to help - but the threat is a tough,
sophisticated, international one.

Threats from abroad? Yes, the threat does exist according to Hal
Hendershot of the FBI.  Robert Clyde reports getting many calls from
people trying to solve security problems.  In keeping with what we
know of reported computer crimes, most sites see problems from
insiders:  employees, consultants and vendors.  Robert reports that
two companies publicly spoke of being approached by former East German
agents for hire for as little as $10,000 at a September conference in
Sweden where he spoke in 1992.  We appear to be seeing the
criminalization of hacker activity that many have long feared: hackers
and ex-foreign intelligence agents for hire.

James Bond is alive and well, thank you

In late 1992 Don Delaney reported the first case he's seen of James
Bond techniques.   Remote surveillance can be done by intercepting,
decoding and displaying the Radio Frequency (RF) emanations of various
computing devices such as terminals and network cabling.   Delaney
reports that in late 1992, an antenna was put up on the balcony of a
19th floor room in New York's Helmsley building pointing at Chemical
Bank.  He indicated that it was being very carefully adjusted before
being locked into position.  By the time they were able to
investigate, the antenna and its manipulator had vanished - presumably
having successfully gathered the intelligence that they were after.
This is no longer gee, we knew it was possible, but holy shit, it's
happening now.  Imagine someone reading your terminal screen from
across the street.

Management's show me attitude

Dave Johnson insists that his biggest problem when he was at Lockheed
was getting corporate management to understand that there is a
problem.  One of the areas in which this type of conference can really
help is understanding the enemy.  Management simply doesn't understand
the thinking of hackers.  Since it makes no sense to them, they tend
to deny its existence until theres proof.  Of course, the proof is
usually very expensive: once a system has been compromised the work of
cleaning it up is a long, hard and complicated.  A well-connected
system or network makes an excellent platform from which to launch
attacks on other hosts or on other networks.

A major problem for Digital in securing their network against Kevin
Mitnick and Lenny DiCicco was that only one vulnerable system on
Digitals EASYnet was needed.  From there, they were able to penetrate
other systems.  Even nodes that were known to have been penetrated and
were secured were penetrated repeatedly by using other vulnerable
nodes to monitor either users or network traffic accessing the secured
nodes.  While at Lockheed, Dave Johnson implemented policies,
awareness training and widescale authentication for all external
access, including dialup lines and telnet connections using
challenge-response tokens or smart cards.  He does not trust the phone
system and assumes that it has been compromised.  Kevin Mitnick and
Lenny DiCicco illustrated just how vulnerable the phone system was in
1988 and the MOD bust in July 1992 shows that things have not
improved.  Kevin reminds us that you must assume the telephone system
is insecure: even robust challenge-response systems can be compromised.
You simply have to play the telecommunications game for real.  Kevin
reminds us that unless you use encryption, all bets are off.  As an
example of how deep, long lived and dedicated a serious attack can be,
consider that Kevin and Lenny were in DEC's network for years.  They
knew exactly what DEC and telco security were doing in their efforts
to catch them since they were reading the security personnel's email.
They evaded the security forces for over 12 months and they had a
pervasive, all powerful, privileged presence on DEC's internal
network.  I've seen the enemy and them is us (this is a quote from
Pogo).

Mitnick insists that people are the weakest link.  According to his
considerable experience, you don't even need to penetrate a system if
you can talk someone on the inside into doing it for you.  Why bother
breaking in to a computer system if you can talk someone in accounts
payable into cutting you a check?  Using the finely tuned tools of
psychological subversion, practiced social manipulators can get most
anything that they want from the ranks of the generally unsuspecting
(uncaring?) employees that inhabit most of our organizations today.
The only cure is a massive and complete educational program that
fosters loyalty, awareness and proper skepticism in every employee.

In the end

Perhaps the strongest message from everyone was that you can't trust
the phone system.  Telephone companies have been, and continue to be,
compromised.  While Mitnick & DiCicco's penetration of DEC's internal
network happened in 1988, the 1992 MOD bust showed us that the same
techniques are still being used successfully today.  Data and voice,
including FAX transmissions, are subject to eavesdropping and
spoofing.  Encryption is absolutely required for secure, trustworthy
communications.

The coupling of social engineering and technical skills is a potent
threat.  Most sites that have addressed technical security are still
wide open to penetration from people who have well-practiced social
engineering skills.  However, in all, you don't even need social
engineering skills to get into most systems.

Are your systems and networks secure?  Are your systems and networks
at risk?  What will you do if you are attacked?  Although the
questions seem simple, they are not.  Future teleconferences will
explore both the questions and the answers in more detail.

++++

Ray Kaplan and Joe Kovara have been independent computer consultants
for more than a decade. They specialize in operating systems, networks
and solving system and network security problems.  Ray Kaplan is also
a well-known writer and lecturer.  He is a regular contributor to
Digital News and Review and other computer trade publications.

Tapes and handout materials for the System and Network Security
teleconference series are available from Ray Kaplan, P.O. Box 42650,
Tucson, AZ  USA 85733 FAX (602) 791-3325 Phone (602) 323-4606.

------------------------------

From: sc03281@LLWNET.LINKNET.COM(Cheshire HS)
Subject: File 2--System Surfing at U-Cal/Davis
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 93 17:44:45 EST

     FROM THE 2-1-93 ISSUE OF INFORMATION WEEK (page 16)

HACKER JOYRIDE: Using the University of California at Davis's computer
system to access government networks, more than 100 young hackers went
for a "joyride" that elicited an FBI investigation. The suspects range
in age from 12 to 22 and hail from several states and countries,
including Finland, Australia, and the former Czechoslovakia. No
arrests have been made as yet pending a formal investigation,
according to John Crowell, manager of workstation support for UC
Davis's IT division. The hackers were detected in mid-October when
charges began piling up on a dormant computer account. Using the
Internet network, the hackers raided systems belonging to the CIA, the
Defense Department, and NASA, among others.  del 1/15 19 21;num;l

------------------------------

Date: 03 Feb 93 18:04:58 EST
From: Gordon Meyer <72307.1502@COMPUSERVE.COM>
Subject: File 3--Unemployed Programmers Turning their Talents to Evil??

Computer  hackers in former communist countries are  creating
mischievous and sometimes costly viruses that threaten computers
around the world.

Anti-virus researchers and special police units in the US and Europe
are trying to thwart the viruses and find the  culprits, US and
British authorities say.

"You've  got  a  lot of frustrated programmers  in  the  East who've
turned their attention to creating viruses,"  says Detective
Constable  Chris  Pierce,  a  member  of  Scotland  Yard's 5-member
computer crime unit.

Investigators say Bulgaria is the source of more than 200 viruses
that threaten Western computers,  including the irritating Yankee
Doodle,  which makes infected machines stop normal  functions to play
the all-American song.

The Bulgarian virus industry developed, Pierce says,  because
programmers there have a lot of knowledge and skill but no  market
for their services in the economically depressed country.

 Computer  viruses are commands usually hidden in  legitimate programs
and  designed  to attach themselves to  files  on  the computer's
"hard drive" data storage device.

Once on the hard drive, viruses perform pranks,  ranging from emitting
harmless noises to eating up files.  They can foul  up home computers,
and companies have lost hundreds of thousands of dollars rooting them
out.

Some of the newest and most insidious viruses reportedly  are coming
from Russia,  including one called LoveChild,  which lies dormant but
sets up a countdown that could take years.  After an infected computer
is turned on the 5000th time,  all its  memory is erased.

Paul  Mungo and Bryan Clough,  in the February issue of  Discover
magazine,  say an unidentified East Coast company lost  $1 million
because of a virus created by a Bulgarian known as  the Dark Avenger.

The article,  excerpted from an upcoming book,  describes the
electronic exploits of the Avenger, whose work is known to Western
police agencies.

The authors call 1 of his latest creations,  Mutating Engine, "the
most dangerous virus ever" because it can disguise itself 4 billion
ways and has no constant characteristic that would  let anti-virus
scanners detect it.

Little is known of the Avenger, the authors say,  except that he
probably graduated from Sofia University in math or  science, needs
money and is infatuated with Diana,  princess  of  Wales, whose name
pops up in some of his viruses.

Mungo and Clough chronicle the Dark Avenger's appearances  on
international  computer  bulletin  boards.  One  Bulgarian-based
board, they say, has been set up just to exchange viruses.

Pierce  says most viruses written in Bulgaria and Russia  are not
actually "out in the wild," where they can get into  foreign
computers.

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 23 Jan 93 01:15:50 PST
From: Ann_Dromeda@orion.nebula.com
Subject: File 4--"Hackers" take on the UFOs?

((MODERATORS' COMMENT: We've read a bit of discussion about UFOs,
"hackers," and guerilla investigators. Whether myth or reality, the
discussions represent a segment of computer culture that others might
find interesting. So, we run the following as a reflection of one
segment of the culture that, even if myth, raises that age-old
question: Is it live, or is it memorex?)).

Rumors have begun to surface about a group of hackers who were
involved in a project to uncover information regarding the existence
of UFOs.  The most public example pertaining to this alleged project
was seen on Dateline NBC on the screen of the mystery hacker
"Quentin."

The story goes that this group of individuals decided to put their
skills to work on a project that, if successful, would legitimize the
hacking process by uncovering information on what has been called the
greatest cover-up in the history of the world.  Milnet TAC ID cards
were obtained through military officials sympathetic to the cause.
Several sites and networks were targeted that had in the past been
linked to UFO activity.  These were sites like the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, Sandia Labs, TRW Space Research, American Institute of
Physics, and various other educational, government and military sites.

The rumors also emphasize that several sites had what these
individuals called "particularly heavy security."  Within several
seconds after connection had been established, system administrators
of sites used in this project were contacted.  Further rumors state
that there was information regarding a propulsion system designed
utilizing what is termed "corona discharge" being analyzed at one
site.  The most sinister of all rumors states that one particular
participant who was allegedly deeply immersed in TRWs internal network
has not been heard from since uncovering data regarding a saucer being
housed at one of their Southern California installations.

Believe what you will about the reality of this project.  Much will be
dismissed as hacker lore, but within the core of every rumor lies a
grain of truth.

Are we being lied to?  Why is this information still classified by the
NSA?  What are they hiding from us behind a maze of security?  Will we
continue to stand idly by and let an uncaring and deliberately evasive
government shield us from what may be the most important, and
potential dangerous news to ever surface?  Information wants to be
free, and only a concerted group effort can make this happen.  How
much do you really want to know about what is really going on?

What follows is information that has been released regarding this
project...

++++++++++++++++++++++++

PROJECT ALF-1

A Planetary Effort

TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET

These are the raw data.  Where comments are appropriate, they will be
included.  The data will be grouped together with dates, names etc. to
make correlations easier.

There are countless references to the aliens, their down space craft
and what the Government is doing with them.  If, as is supposed, the
research on the craft and the 'ufonauts' continues today, then
undoubtedly there are computer records, somewhere.

I. Searching the Skies; Tripping the Electronic Fence around the USA.

US Space Command Space Surveillance Center, Cheyenne Mountain,
Colorado Springs, Box Nine (Electronic Surveillance Room) (This is
where they search for and track UFO activity.) U.S. Naval Space
Surveillance System, Dahlgreen, Virginia, (Main computer), Lake
Kickapoo, Texas (listening post): Search for
'Flash Traffic'
Commander Sheila Mondran
CINC-NORAD
Space Detection and Tracking System
Malabar, Florida
'Teal Amber' search
National Military Command Center - Pentagon
(These are the areas where UFO activity is tracked.
There is a radar shield around the country that is 'tripped' by UFO's.
All tracking and F14 scrambling is done through this system.)

II. The Second Cover Up

Defense Intelligence Agency
Directorate for Management and Operations
Project Aquarius (in conjunction with SRI)

Colonel Harold E. Phillips, Army (where/what Feb. 1987)
UFO Working Group, (formed Dec 1987)
Major General James Pfautz, USAF, Ret. (March 87)
US Army experiments -(Monroe Institute, Faber, VA)
Major General Albert Stubblebine
Capt. Guy Kirkwood,
(thousands of feet of film of UFO's catalogued and on record somewhere.)
The UFO Working Group was formed because one arm of the Govt doesn't
know what the other is doing.)

III. National Security

NSA NAtional Security Agency, Dundee Society (Super secret elite
who have worked on UFO's.)
NSA - Research and Engineering Division
NSA - Intercept Equipment Division
Kirtland Force Base, Office of Special Investigations, Project
Beta. 1979-83-?  (Sandia Labs are here.)
Paul Bennewitz
Project Blue
Project Blue Book

(NSA computers do analysis for Pentagon.)

IV. More Secret Players

NASA, Fort Irwin, Barstow, CA
NASA Ames Research Center, Moffet Field Naval Base
SETI
State Dept. Office of Advanced Technology
Any Astronauts from Mercury, Gemini and Apollo
CIA - Office of Scientific Investigation
CIA - Domestic Collection Division

(NASA has known about UFO's since the astronauts saw and photoed them.
Records somewhere.)

V.  Dealing with the Secret

MJ-12 (1952)
Majectic 12
Operation Majestic 12
MAJIC-12
Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter
Dr. Vannevar Bush
Dr. Detlev Bronk
Dr. Jerome Hunsaker
Dr. Donald Menzel
Dr. Lloyd Berkner
General Robt. Montague
Sidney Souers
Gordon Gray
General Hoyt Vandenberg
Sect State James Forrestal
General Nathan Twining
Pres. Truman
Pres. Eisenhower

            (One of the biggest secrets ever.)

Nevada Desert, Area 51, S4 (houses UFO's)
(Robert Lazar talked!) 9 space ships on storage. Propulsion by
corona discharge.

(Area 51 is the most protected base on the planet.)

VI. ROSWELL, NM Crashes
Mac Brazel (farmer)
Major Jesse A. Marcel
509th. Bomber Group
Lewis Rickett, CIC Officer
Colonel William Blanchard
Gerald Anderson, witness to crash and aliens

Wright Patterson Air Force Base, (parts lists of UFO's catalogued;
autopsies on record) (Bodies in underground facility)
Foreign Technology Building
USAAF (United States Army Air Force reports: "Early Automation"
Muroc, CA (Base with UFO's for study)

(1 saucer with 4 aliens.  They were transported to Wright and then
saved, catalogued and autopsied.)

VII. THOSE ON GOVT SHIT LIST

(People who have gotten close.)

Robert Lazar
Major Donald Keyhoe
William Moore
Stanton Friedman
Jaime Shandera
Whitley Streiber
Timothy Goode, UK

Other UFO Crashes
Del Rio, TX 12/50, Colonel Robert Willingham
Las Vegas, 4/18/62
Kecksburg, PA 12/9/65

VIII. International

Belgian Air Force.  (They are going public and have records.
Press conference held 7/12/91.)
Australian Air Force
UK; GCHQ
British Air Force
Belgium:
NATO Radar Stations

IX. UFO Civilian Groups. (What do they really know?)

NICAP, National Investigations Committee on Aerial Phenomena
(private company.)

APRO, Tucson, AZ (Aerial Phenomena Research Organization,
private company.)

MUFON Mutual UFO Network

X. GENERAL

Kenneth Arnold, June 24, 1947
Cattle and Sheep Mutilations
General and Pres. Eisenhower, (private files and library)
President Truman
Wright Field or Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, OH, (Air
Force Foreign Technology Division)
USAF Project Saint
USAF Project Gemini
Project Moon Dust
Project Sign
Project Grudge
General Hoyt Vandenberg (1940-1960)
Air Force Regulation 200-2 (8/12/54)
Holloman AFB, NM
Roswell, NM July 7, 1947


XI. Possible Searches

Presidential Libraries
Old USAAF, (United States Army Air Force)
NASA
Astronaut Frank Borman, Gemini 7, pictures of UFO
Neil Armstrong, Apollo 11, saw UFO's on moon.
Colonel Gordon Cooper saw a bunch of them
James McDivitt, 6/66
United Nations
NATO;
General Lionel Max Chassin, French Air Force
Star Wars, United Kingdom, 23 scientists killed in 6 years.
Gulf Breeze, FL
Additional UFO records at NSA, CIA, DIA,  FBI


Good Searching.


+++++++++++++++++

                    Project
                ->Green Cheese<-
                   Data Base


++++++++++++++++++
Holloman AFB
   Location: New Mexico.  Preconceived landing 15 years ago.


DDN Locations:
+++++++

NET : 132.5.0.0 : HOLLOMAN :

GATEWAY : 26.9.0.74, 132.5.0.1 : HOLLOMAN-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :: EGP,IP/GW :
GATEWAY : 26.9.0.74, 132.5.0.1 : HOLLOMAN-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :: EGP,IP/GW :


HOST : 26.10.0.74 : HOLLOMAN-TG.AF.MIL : VAX-8650 : VMS : TCP/FTP,TCP/TELNET,TCP
       SMTP :

HOST : 26.6.0.74 : HOLLOMAN-AM1.AF.MIL : WANG-VS100 : VSOS : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,
       TCP/SMTP :

Host: DDNVAX2.6585TG.AF.MIL
      156.6.1.2

+++++++++++++++++++++++

Kirtland Air Force Base
    Office Of Special Investigations.  Sandia Labs are here. Also part of
    NSA Intercept Equipment Division.

Key Words/names:
++++++++
Sandia Labs
Project Beta (1979-83-?)
Paul Bennewitz
Project Blue
Project Blue Book

DDN Locations:
+++++++

NET : 131.23.0.0 : KIRTLAND-NET :
NET : 132.62.0.0 : KIRTLAND2 :
GATEWAY : 26.17.0.48, 131.23.0.1 : KIRTLAND2-GW.AF.MIL,KIRTLAND-GW.AF.MIL
        : CISCO-MGS : UNIX : IP/GW,EGP :
GATEWAY : 26.18.0.87, 132.62.0.1
        : KIRTLAND1-GW.AF.MIL,KIRTLAND1606ABW-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :
        : EGP,IP/GW :
HOST : 26.0.0.48 : KIRTLAND.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.0.0.87 : KIRTLAND2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.6.0.87 : KIRTLAND-AM1.AF.MIL : WANG-VS300 : VS ::

+++++++++++++++++++++++

NASA
   What can I say about NASA that you couldn't guess for yourself....
   (Except that the following sights are SPECIFIC NASA sights, not
   just randomly suspected sights).

DDN locations:
+++++++

Fort Irwin, Barstow, CA:
+++++++++
NET : 134.66.0.0 : IRWIN :
NET : 144.146.0.0 : FTIRWIN1 :
NET : 144.147.0.0 : FTIRWIN2 :
GATEWAY : 26.24.0.85, 26.7.0.230, 144.146.0.1, 144.147.0.0
        : FTIRWIN-GW1.ARMY.MIL : CISCO-GATEWAY : CISCO : IP/GW,EGP :
HOST : 26.14.0.39 : IRWIN-ASBN.ARMY.MIL : NCR-COMTEN-3650 : COS2 ::
HOST : 26.13.0.85 : FTIRWIN-AMEDD.ARMY.MIL : ATT-3B2-600G : UNIX
     : TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/TELNET :
HOST : 26.14.0.85 : FTIRWIN-IGNET.ARMY.MIL : DATAPOINT-8605 : RMS ::
HOST : 26.15.0.85 : IRWIN-EMH1.ARMY.MIL,FTIRWIN-EMH1.ARMY.MIL : SPERRY-5000
     : UNIX : TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/TELNET :

Moffet Field Naval Base (Ames Research Center):
+++++++++++++++++++++
GATEWAY : 26.20.0.16, 192.52.195.1 : MOFFETT-FLD-MB.DDN.MIL,AMES-MB.DDN.MIL
        : C/70 : CHRYSALIS : IP/GW,EGP :
HOST : 26.0.0.16 : MOFFETT.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :

+++++++++++++++++++++++
Pentagon (National Military Command Center)
    One of many places in charge of tracking UFO activity.


Possible DDN sights:
+++++++

GATEWAY : 26.9.0.26, 134.205.123.140 : PENTAGON-GW.HQ.AF.MIL : CISCO-AGS :
        : EGP,IP/GW :
GATEWAY : 26.25.0.26, 131.8.0.1 : PENTAGON-GW.AF.MIL,HQUSAFNET-GW.AF.MIL
        : CISCO-MGS :: IP/GW,EGP :
GATEWAY : 26.10.0.76, 192.31.75.235 : PENTAGON-BCN-GW.ARMY.MIL : SUN-360
        : UNIX : IP/GW,EGP :
GATEWAY : 26.26.0.247, 192.31.75.1 : PENTAGON-GW.ARMY.MIL : SUN-3/160
        : UNIX : EGP,IP/GW :
GATEWAY : 26.31.0.247, 26.16.0.26, 141.116.0.1 : PENTAGON-GW1.ARMY.MIL
        : CISCO : CISCO : IP/GW,EGP :
HOST : 26.0.0.26 : PENTAGON.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.24.0.26 : OPSNET-PENTAGON.AF.MIL : VAX-8500 : VMS
     : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP :
HOST : 26.10.0.76, 192.31.75.235 : PENTAGON-BCN.ARMY.MIL : SUN-360 : UNIX
     : TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/TELNET :
HOST : 26.0.0.247 : PENTAGON2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.7.0.247 : PENTAGON-AMSNET.ARMY.MIL : AMDAHL : MVS
     : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP :
HOST : 26.14.0.247 : NSSC-PENTAGON.NAVY.MIL : ALTOS-3068A : UNIX
     : TCP/FTP,TCP/TELNET,TCP/SMTP :
HOST : 26.18.0.247 : PENTAGON-EMH4.ARMY.MIL : SPERRY-5000/80 : UNIX
     : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP :
HOST : 26.26.0.247, 192.31.75.1 : PENTAGON-AI.ARMY.MIL : SUN-3/160 : UNIX
     : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/FINGER :

+++++++++++++++++++++++

Raddaman
   Location of infamous building 18a.  Suspected saucers and others?

DDN location, yet unknown.


++++++++++++++++++++++++++

SECI
     ?

DDN Locations:
+++++++

NET : 192.108.216.0 : ARC-SETI-NET :

++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Utah Locations:



GATEWAY : 26.18.0.20, 131.27.0.1 : HILL-GW.AF.MIL,HILLAFBNET-GW.AF.MIL
       : CISCO-MGS :: IP/GW,EGP :

GATEWAY : 26.18.0.20, 131.27.0.1 : HILL-GW.AF.MIL,HILLAFBNET-GW.AF.MIL
        : CISCO-MGS :: IP/GW,EGP :

HOST : 26.5.0.20 : HILL.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.0.0.99 : HILL2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.12.0.99 : HILL-AM1.AF.MIL : WANG-VS100 : VS
     : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP :

++++++++++++++++++++++++

Wright Patterson AFB
 Catalogued UFO parts list.  Autopsies on record.  Bodies located in
 underground facility of Foreign Technology Building.

DDN Locations:
+++++++


HOST : 26.0.0.47 : WRIGHTPAT.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.8.0.123 : WRIGHTPAT2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.0.0.124 : WRIGHTPAT3.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.3.0.170 : WAINWRIGHT-IGNET.ARMY.MIL : CONVERGENT-TECH-CN-100
     : CTOS ::
HOST : 26.0.0.176 : WRIGHTPAT4.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :

++++++++++++++++++++++++

Nevada:


NET : 131.216.0.0 : NEVADA :


++++++++++++++++++++++++

Random Suspected Nets:

WIN:
  Top Secret Network.  All coordinator's have last name Win.

NET : 141.8.0.0  : DFN-WIN8  : NET : 141.9.0.0  : DFN-WIN9  :
NET : 141.10.0.0 : DFN-WIN10 : NET : 141.15.0.0 : DFN-WIN15 :
NET : 141.25.0.0 : DFN-WIN25 : NET : 141.26.0.0 : DFN-WIN26 :
NET : 141.28.0.0 : DFN-WIN28 : NET : 141.57.0.0 : DFN-WIN57 :
NET : 141.58.0.0 : DFN-WIN58 : NET : 141.59.0.0 : DFN-WIN59 :
NET : 141.60.0.0 : DFN-WIN60 : NET : 141.61.0.0 : DFN-WIN61 :
NET : 141.62.0.0 : DFN-WIN62 : NET : 141.63.0.0 : DFN-WIN63 :
NET : 141.64.0.0 : DFN-WIN64 : NET : 141.65.0.0 : DFN-WIN65 :
NET : 141.66.0.0 : DFN-WIN66 : NET : 141.67.0.0 : DFN-WIN67 :
NET : 141.68.0.0 : DFN-WIN68 : NET : 141.69.0.0 : DFN-WIN69 :
NET : 141.70.0.0 : DFN-WIN70 : NET : 141.71.0.0 : DFN-WIN71 :
NET : 141.72.0.0 : DFN-WIN72 : NET : 141.73.0.0 : DFN-WIN73 :
NET : 141.74.0.0 : DFN-WIN74 : NET : 141.75.0.0 : DFN-WIN75 :
NET : 141.76.0.0 : DFN-WIN76 : NET : 141.77.0.0 : DFN-WIN77 :
NET : 141.78.0.0 : DFN-WIN78 : NET : 141.79.0.0 : DFN-WIN79 :
NET : 141.80.0.0 : DFN-WIN80 : NET : 141.81.0.0 : DFN-WIN81 :
NET : 141.82.0.0 : DFN-WIN82 : NET : 141.83.0.0 : DFN-WIN83 :
NET : 141.84.0.0 : DFN-WIN84 : NET : 141.85.0.0 : DFN-WIN85 :
NET : 141.86.0.0 : DFN-WIN86 : NET : 141.87.0.0 : DFN-WIN87 :
NET : 141.88.0.0 : DFN-WIN88 : NET : 141.89.0.0 : DFN-WIN89 :
NET : 141.90.0.0 : DFN-WIN90 : NET : 141.91.0.0 : DFN-WIN91 :
NET : 141.92.0.0 : DFN-WIN92 : NET : 141.93.0.0 : DFN-WIN93 :
NET : 141.94.0.0 : DFN-WIN94 : NET : 141.95.0.0 : DFN-WIN95 :
NET : 141.96.0.0 : DFN-WIN96 : NET : 141.97.0.0 : DFN-WIN97 :
NET : 141.98.0.0 : DFN-WIN98 : NET : 141.99.0.0 : DFN-WIN99 :
NET : 188.1.0.0  : WIN-IP    : NET : 192.80.90.0 : WINDATA  :

+++++++++++++++

Scinet:
      Sensitive Compartmented Information Network

NET : 192.12.188.0 : BU-SCINET :

+++++++++++++++

Disnet:
      Defense Integrated Secure Network.  Composed of SCINET, WINCS
      ([World Wide Military and Command Control System] Intercomputer
      Network Communication Subsystem), and Secretnet(WIN).

NET : 22.0.0.0 : DISNET :

------------------------------

End of Computer Underground Digest #5.13
************************************

